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By examining a large number of Swedish listed firms, we analyse how institutional 
and  foreign  owners  affect  investment  performance.  To  measure  investment 
performance  Mueller  and  Reardon’s  (1993)  marginal  q  is  used,  although  derived 
directly  from  Tobin’s  average  q.  Marginal  q  measures  the  ratio  of  the  return  on 
investment to the cost of capital. Our findings show that both domestic and foreign 
institutional owners positively influence firm performance. Furthermore a non-linear 
relation between institutional ownership concentration and performance is found. This 
is consistent with positive incentive effects and negative entrenchment effects. During 
the last decades the ownership structure of Swedish firms has undergone dramatic 
changes: institutional and foreign investors have been increasing their stakes, whereas 
Swedish  households  have  decreased  in  importance.  Controlling  owners,  often 
founding families, remain in control by resorting to an extensive use of dual-class 
shares. The practice of dual-class shares which separates cash-flow rights and control 
rights is also found to be an important determinant of firm performance that eradicates 
the positive influence of institutional ownership. 
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Introduction  
Over  the  last  decades  the  role  of  institutional  and  foreign  investors  has  grown 
dramatically. The growing importance of this kind of investors has been coupled with 
an  increased  interest  in  the  role  and  effect’s  of  this  “anonymous-capital”.  These 
institutional investors, both foreign and domestic, are often called upon to solve and 
minimize  the  managerial  discretion  problems  through  their  role  as  large  and 
influential  owners  (Demsetz,  1983  and  Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1986).  The  central 
question is whether institutional investors, aggravate or reduce managerial discretion 
problems in listed firms? 
 
One problem with institutional investors as owners is that they often own relatively 
small stakes in the individual firms in their investment portfolios. This provides weak 
incentives to actively exercise corporate control
3. Furthermore, it is sometimes argued 
that even though they might exert substantial pressure on managements, the costs of 
monitoring often seem to outweigh the benefits.  
 
This  paper  provides  empirical  evidence  on  the  impact  of  ownership  on  firms’ 
investment  performance.  In  particular  the  influence  of  domestic  institutional  and 
foreign owners is investigated. An additional question addressed in the paper is how 
dual-class shares relate to ownership and firm performance. Similar studies have used 
measures’  of  Tobin’s  average  q,  as  a  measure  of  firm  performance  (Morck  et  al 
(1988), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Loderer and Martin 
(1997),  McConnell  and  Servaes  (1990),  Himmelberg  et  al  (1999),  Cho  (1998), 
Demsetz  and  Villalonga  (2001),  Dahlqvist  and  Robetsson  (2001),  Cronqvist  and 
Nilsson (2003)). For an extended survey see Gugler (2001). However, Tobin’s q has 
some  drawbacks.  For  the  purpose  of  testing  investment  efficiency  a  marginal 
performance measure is more appropriate (Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004). This paper 
adopts  such  a  performance  measure,  marginal  q,  as  developed  by  Mueller  and 
Reardon (1993). This measure gives the ratio of a firm’s return on investment to its 
cost of capital. 
 
A distinctive feature of the Continental European corporate governance system, and 
particularly the Swedish one, is the strong concentration of ownership (Agnblad et al. 
2001).  Pyramids,  cross-holdings  and  dual-class  shares  are  three  common  methods 
used to maintain ownership whilst attracting new capital. In Sweden this has produced 
remarkable  persistent  ownership  structures,  in  combination  with  a  relatively  vital 
capital market. As in most Continental European countries, large commercial banks 
have played, and still play, a fundamental role (Högfeldt, 2004). These factors make 
Sweden an interesting case when the impact of ownership on firm performance is 
investigated.  The  main  contribution  of  this  paper  is  that  we  provide  empirical 
evidence on the effect of institutional ownership on firms’ investment performance. 
Using the marginal q as a measure of performance, rather than Tobin’s average q, we 
are  able  to  reduce  some  of  the  usual  problems  of  omitted  variables  and  reverse 
causality. By investigating a sample of Swedish listed firms we also present evidence 
on a negative relation between dual-class shares and investment performance. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized in seven sections. Section 2 gives a short 
description of the Swedish corporate ownership structure. In section 3 institutional 
                                                 
3 For an excellent survey of shareholder activism, see Gillian and Starks (2000).   3 
investors are discussed. From this discussion we also formulate our hypothesis about 
how  they  affect  firm  performance.  Methodology  and  derivation  of  the marginal  q 
measure  are  given  in  section  4.  Variables  and  descriptive  statistics  are  presented 
alongside a discussion about the data in section 5. Section 6 deals with the empirical 
results and analysis. Conclusions end the paper in section 7. 
 
 
Corporate Ownership in Sweden 
Following the repeal of restrictions on foreign ownership in 1993, foreign investors 
have bought into the leading Swedish companies on a large scale. Currently foreigners 
own around one-third of the outstanding equity on the Stockholm Stock Exchange 
(Statistics  Sweden,  2006),  see  Figure  1.  During  the  same  period,  changes  in  the 
Swedish pension system have made substantial amounts available for private financial 
institutions to invest on behalf of the Swedish population. Domestic institutional and 
foreign owners are thus becoming the dominating owners in Sweden, accounting for 
about 85 per cent of the stock market capitalization.   
 
Figure 1.    Ownership of shares listed on a Swedish Stock Exchange 
 
Share of market value in per cent 
 
 
With a stock exchange dominated by a few very large firms, the Swedish corporate 
governance system seems to have been remarkably successful in generating large, 
internationally  competitive  firms.  Most  firms,  even  many  large  firms,  are  often 
closely held by a family. The main instruments to maintain control in the Swedish 
firms are dual-class shares (Angblad et al., 2001) combined with pyramidal holding 
companies (closed-end investment funds). Sweden is in fact among the few countries 
that are characterised by an extensive use of both dual-class shares and pyramidal 
ownership  (La  Porta  et  al.,  1999).  A  study  that  demonstrates  the  relevance  of 
ownership structure in the allocation of firms’ resources is Alonso et al., (2005). They 
use a dataset, similar to this study, of 101 large non-financial publicly-traded Spanish 
firms and also a similar panel-data approach. However, the study takes no account of 
any  formal  separation  between  capital  ownership  and  vote  control.  Cronqvist  and 
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Tobin’s q, for a panel of Swedish listed firms during 1991-1997. Their results show a 
negative effect of controlling shareholders votes on Tobin’s average q. The wedge 
between votes and cash flow rights is however found to be statistically insignificant. 
 
Proponents of the Swedish governance system often argue that significant ownership 
stakes and control in the hands of one or few owners is vital in order to create correct 
incentive  structures  of  entrepreneurs  and  managers.  There  is  however  no  research 
which gives support to these claims. 
 
Equity stakes may tilt insiders such as managers and controlling owners’ incentives 
towards  the  pursuit  of  share-value  maximizing  strategies.  However,  ownership 
concentration could also lead to expropriation of outside minority shareholders, as 
shown by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Thus, large voting stakes held by insiders may 
not necessarily lead to performance improvement. In fact, McEachern (1975) argues 
that  large  shareholdings  in  the  hands  of  the  insiders  (managers)  might  actually 
deteriorate the performance of the firms. Since then more studies supportive of this 
claim, such as Morck et al., (1988) and Gugler et al., (2002), have been carried out on 
the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. 
 
Another effect of the Swedish corporate governance model, with its strong separation 
of ownership and control, is that it locks in owners for long periods of time. The 
widespread use of dual-class shares and pyramid structures can thus have substantial 
costs in terms of loss of dynamics in ownership and control. Due to these minority 
control arrangements hostile takeovers for example are very rare. Moreover, the costs 





A features common to all institutional investors is that they provide a form of risk 
pooling for small investors, hence providing a better trade-off of risk and return than 
what is achievable via direct holdings. Today, different kinds of institutional investors 
deal with various markets and clients, and for various purposes. Many act on several 
markets simultaneously and the competition is fierce for market shares and clients. 
Hence, institutional investors are far from a homogeneous group. They differ in terms 
of contractual relations between the owners of the assets and the asset managers, in 
the rules determining the distribution of risk and return, as well as in the definition of 
their  liabilities.  The  institutional  investors  this  paper  is  concerned  with  can  be 
summarized as pension funds, life insurance companies, and mutual funds.  
 
One factor favouring institutional investors relative to individuals is their ability to 
absorb and process information. In many cases it is this informational advantage that 
the consumer pays for. This advantage has also given rise to the expression “informed 
investors”  which  distinguishes  this  type  of  professional  investor  from  the  average 
individual. However, the information advantage might be large or small depending on 
the type of institution, and the type of information.  
 
With the size of many institutions also follows the potential for improved control over 
companies  in  which  they  invest.  Hirschman  (1970)  shows  how  “exit  and  voice” 
behaviour might work to reduce moral hazard problems. Berle (1960) also argues that   5 
institutional investors might discipline managers through their importance as market 
participants;  he  describes  this  as  “power  without  property”  (Mueller,  2003). 
Institutional  owners  might  for  that  reason  be  well  apt  to  minimize  the  problems 
associated with the separation of ownership and control, originally presented by Berle 
and Means (1932). 
 
It is important to note that the institution in itself suffers from the same incentive 
problems between its owners and managers. This kind of incentive problems may also 
arise between other parties related to, and within, the institution; for instance, between 
the  board  of  directors  and  the  asset  management.  This  leads  us  to  another 
characteristic of the institutional investors, the asset management. 
 
There are different incentive problems in the asset management relationship. On the 
one hand, it gives rise to an essentially fiduciary relationship to the ultimate investor, 
a relationship that often entails a degree of caution in the portfolio strategy and a 
desire to limit risks incurred. On the other hand, such delegation raises principal-agent 
problems. So, unless the fund manager is perfectly monitored and/or a perfect contract 
is drawn up, the fund manager may act in his or her own interests (e.g., in generating 
excessive commission income) or in the interest of financial institutions related to 
them. These objectives may even be contrary to those of the liability holders or at 
least not direct in line with their interests (Davis and Steil, 2001). 
 
Despite  the  very  high  percentage  of  the  total  market  capitalization  controlled  by 
institutions,  institutional  investors  are  not  major  players  from  an  ownership 
perspective  (Goergen  and  Renneboog,  2001).  Although  their  accumulated 
shareholdings are significant, shareholdings in individual companies are often small 
(an explanation to this is that institutions more than others invest in large companies. 
Gompers and Metrick (2001) have provided evidence that this is the case in the U.S. 
stock market). In the Swedish listed firms the aggregate institutional shareholdings are 
on average around ten percent. Hence the potential benefits from active monitoring 
can hardly outweigh the costs for institutional investors. This prompts institutions to 
free ride on corporate control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Dahlqvist and Robertsson, 
2001). Furthermore, some institutional investors, such as certain mutual funds, invest 
in accordance with low-cost passive strategies and thus lack the resources for active 
monitoring of the large number of companies in their portfolios. In order to remain 
cost-efficient, rather than engage in active monitoring, institutional investors prefer to 
simply “exit” and sell off poorly performing firms. The crucial question is therefore 
whether or not the potential benefits from monitoring outweigh the costs of doing so.  
 
Another reason for the low institutional involvement in corporate governance issues is 
insider-trading  regulations  (Goergen  and  Renneboog,  2001).  If  the  institutional 
investors  do  not  want  to  immobilize  parts  of  their  portfolios,  they  might  have  to 
restrict active involvement in corporate strategies.  
 
The  discussion  above  shows  that  a  negative  relationship  between  institutional 
ownership and firm performance is likely. But there are also many reasons to expect 
that the relationship is actually positive.  
 
As institutional investors are constantly being evaluated by how well they succeed in 
creating shareholder value (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000), there is not much room for   6 
catering to other objectives (as far as competition works as a stick). In this sense the 
incentives, to use “exit or voice” in value-increasing manner, are probably stronger 
than  for  other  types  of  owners.  That  is,  in  spite  of  comparatively  low  ownership 
stakes, the focus of institutional investors is predominantly on shareholder value. 
  
Furthermore, risk aversion is less likely to play a role in the governance actions of 
institutional owners. Risk diversification characterizes institutional owners to a larger 
extent than other ownership categories. Therefore they can be argued to have a more 
positive view of risky projects with a higher net present value. Considering these two 
aspects as well as favourable financing conditions, we expect, similar to Thomsen and 




As most foreign investors are in fact institutions (Sundqvist, 2006) we expect the 
same effect on firm performance as for domestic institutional investors. In line with 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) we therefore hypothesize that domestic institutional 
and foreign owners will use the influence that goes along with increasing ownership 
shares in a value increasing manner, i.e. 
  
Hypothesis  1  (H1):  Domestic  institutional  and  foreign  ownership  has  a 
positive impact on investment performance.  
 
Most likely this potentially positive effect will be diminishing. This notion has also 
been widely supported by previous literature (see amongst others Morck et al., 1988; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990; and Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998; Pindado and de la 
Torre  (2006);  Miguel  et  al.,  (2004)).  We  therefore  expect  that  the  impact  of 
institutional ownership on firm performance is non-linear (marginally diminishing). 
Assuming that most of the positive effects occur at a given threshold of ownership 
concentration, it is plausible to assume that this effect will not continue to increase 
linearly as ownership increase further. Hypothesis two is therefore:  
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Investment performance will increase at a diminishing rate 
with increasing domestic institutional and foreign ownership share. 
 
There are also some studies that have investigated institutional ownership and vote 
differentiated shares i.e. Bjuggren, et al., (2007) and Gompers and Metrick (2001). A 
working paper by Li et al., (2006) also addresses this issue. They find for U.S. data 
that  institutions  have  smaller  ownership  stakes  in  firms  with  vote  differentiated 
shares. Furthermore Li et al., (2006) find that institutional owners to a larger extent 
“exit” this type of firms. Their findings give an extra explanation to the arguments put 
forward in (Bjuggren et al., 2007) on why the existence of vote differentiated shares 
are likely to have a negative impact on investment performance. In a market where 
this type of control instrument is allowed, it is consequently important to control for 
this effect. Since the incentive structure and the ability to exert control are altered 
when vote rights are separated from cash-flow rights by vote-differentiated shares, we 
expect an impact on the ability of institutional owners to exert control:  
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Hypothesis 3 (H3):  Separation of cash-flow rights from control by use of 
dual-class  shares  will  reduce  the  effects  domestic  institutional  and  foreign 
ownership has on firm performance.  
 
Given  the  negative  view  of  vote-differentiated  shares,  an  explanation  has  to  be 
provided why these types of share are bought by institutional investors. Gompers and 
Metrick  (2001)  find  that  institutions  invest  in  liquid  stock.  For  many  Swedish 
companies with A- and B-shares it is only the B-shares that are regularly traded. We 





To test the impact of institutional ownership on firm performance we estimate the 
firms’  marginal  q  (Mueller  and  Reardon,  1993).  The  marginal  q  is  essentially  a 
marginal version of Tobin’s average q. This is a more correct measure to use when 
evaluating firm performance since it is the return on the marginal investment rather 
than the average that shows whether the firm is over- or under-investing relative to its 
cost of capital. 
 
Marginal q can be derived from Tobin’s q, where Tobin’s average q, qa, is defined as 
the market value, Mt, divided by the replacement cost of the firm capital at time t, Kt: 
 
t a t t q K M , / =                 1) 
 
This measures the average return on the capital over its cost of capital. If qa is above 
one this implies that the firm should be investing further. However, for adjustments of 
the capital stock the marginal return on capital is more relevant. Marginal q measures 
the marginal return on capital, i.e. investments. Marginal q, qm, can be derived from 
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where –δ  is the depreciation rate. Since the market value in period t can be written as: 
 
t t t t t M PV M M µ δ + − + = − − 1 1            3) 
 
where  PVt  is  the  present  value  of  the  cash  flows  that  investments  in  period  t,  It, 
generate,  and  µt  a  standard  error  term.  The  net  present  value  rule  of  investments 
stipulates that investments should be made up to the point where PVt = It. This implies  
PVt/It = 1, which can be rewritten as PVt/It = qm. By dividing both sides of equation 3 
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Equation (4) assumes that the capital market is efficient in the sense that future cash 
flows are unbiased estimates. As t grows larger the term 1 − t t M µ will approach 0.  
 
The marginal q, qm, has a number of advantages. Above all a marginal performance 
measure  is  more  appropriate  than  an  average  Tobin’s  q,  when  testing  hypotheses 
about managerial discretion, since average measures of performance confuse average 
and marginal returns. Secondly, qm has a straightforward interpretation. In Figure 2, i 
is the return on investments, r is the cost of capital, I is investments, and qm = (i/r) is 
marginal q. If managers invest in a project that yields a return that is less than the cost 
of capital, qm < 1, which means that managers are over-investing (qm < 1 see Figure 
2). That is, the marginal investment has a return less than the cost of capital and the 
shareholders would have been better off if the firm had distributed these funds directly 
to them instead. For the firm to maximize shareholder-value, qm must be equal to one. 
Conversely, if qm > 1 managers are not making enough investments. This means that 
the marginal investment has a return in excess of the cost of capital and that the firm 
should have invested more (qm > 1 in figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Marginal q and the cost of capital 
 
To  estimate  equation  (4)  we  need  data  on  the  market  value  of  firms  and  their 
investments. The market value of a firm is defined as all debt plus the total value of 
all its outstanding shares at the end of t. 
 
According to the originators, Mueller and Reardon (1993), investment is measured as:  
I = After tax profits + Depreciation – Dividends + ∆Debt + ∆Equity + R&D + ADV, 
where ∆D and ∆E are funds raised using new debt and equity issues. R&D and ADV 
(advertising expenditures) are also forms of investment, which may contribute to a 
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DVT  (total  dividends),  DT  (total  debt),  SSTK-PRSTKC  (new  equity),  XRD  (R&D)  and  XSGA 
(approximation of adverting and marketing expenditures).   




qm > 1  qm < 1   9 
Data and variables  
All data on the firms’ market values and investments are provided by Standard and 
Poor’s  Compustat  Global  database.  The  period  covered  by  the  data  is  1999  until 
2005.  The  time  period  covered  in  the  regressions  is  2000-2005,  due  to  the  first 
difference in the dependent variable. In order to study the same individual firms for 
several  periods,  all  firms  had  to  provide  data  for  at  least  three  subsequent  years. 
Furthermore,  financial  firms  were  removed  form  the  sample  due  to  the  particular 
nature of their investments. The ownership data is provided by SIS Ownership Corp 
(SIS-Ägarservice AB), which is a unique database covering ownership structure, on a 




All things considered, the set-up requirements produced a sample of 110 Swedish 
firms. The sample firms correspond to an aggregate share of more than 85 percent of 
the total market capitalisation at the Stockholm Stock Exchange, and approximately 
75 per cent of the total Swedish export value. 
 
The variable institutional ownership is made up of the aggregate ownership controlled 
by institutions, both in terms of cash flow rights (IC) and vote rights (IV).
7 Belonging 
to this group of institutional owners are: banks, pension and mutual funds, insurance 
companies and endowment foundations. The different ownership categories and how 
they are defined and grouped are summarized in Table 1. 
 









All firms controlled by individuals as well as other firms. The private owner can 
either be the founder of the firm or an investor who has acquired control.
A 
 
Foreign  The category refers to companies controlled by a foreign owner. This owner can be 
an institution as well as an individual since it is hard to separate these two groups 
with certainty. The majority of these foreign owners are financial institutions of 
different kinds. 
 
Institutional  All companies controlled by a Swedish financial institution belong to this category. 
In all cases the institutions belong to one of the three following types. 
Insurance company 
Insurance company-controlled companies are all firms that have an insurance 
company as their largest owner. Note however that mutual funds belonging to an 
insurance company make a separate group of controlling owner. 
Mutual fund 
As the name indicates, all companies controlled by a mutual fund; a fund can either 
belong to a bank; an insurance company or the state-owned pension funds. 
Foundation 
This category includes foundations donated by private individuals as well as, for 
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Depository), which operates under the supervision of the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority and 
functions as a central securities depository and clearinghouse. 
7 The same notation applies for foreign ownership (FC) and (FV).   10 
A Although no firm in the sample had a bank as a controlling owner this category would include companies directly controlled by 
one of the Swedish banks. This category of owners also includes the typical Swedish closed-end investment funds (CEIF’s), i.e. 
INVESTOR Ltd. These CEFI’s function as holding corporations for Swedish ownership spheres, and can be characterised as 
having objectives different form what is usually referred to by institutional owners. 
 
A  list  of  the  variables  used  in  the  regressions,  together  with  their  definitions,  is 
provided in Table 2. 
 









Change in total market value  
It/Mt-1  Investments normalized by market value in previous period 
C1  Share of capital owned by the largest owner (cash-flow rights) 
V1  Voting rights controlled by the largest owner 
FC  Share of capital owned by foreign investors 
FV  Voting rights controlled by foreign investors 
IC  Share of capital owned by institutional investors 
IV  Voting rights controlled by institutional investors 
Votes minus 
Capital, (V1-C1)  
 
Votes controlled by largest owner minus votes related to capital share held by 
largest owner. 
 
VoteDifferention  Dummy variable for vote-differentiated shares. 1 if dual-class shares, 0 if one-
share-one-vote.  
 
Sales   Total sales (millions SEK) 
 
 
Descriptive statistics for the variables in the regressions is provided in Table 3. In 
addition to the variables used in the regressions descriptive statistics of the firms’ 
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Table 3.  Descriptive statistics 










           
Mt-Mt-1/Mt-1  0.128  0.468  -0.941  2.874  651 
It/Mt-1  0.316  0.382  -1.118  3.539  651 
           
C1  23.41  15.51  1.0  74.5  651 
V1  35.69  20.22  2.5  89.5  651 
           
FC  21.50  18.36  0.3  91.1  651 
FV  18.79  19.19  0.1  93.5  651 
           
IC  13.99  12.00  0  55.5  651 
IV  10.65  10.42  0.1  54.9  651 
           
IC plus FC  35.49  21.48  0.3  94.2  651 
IV plus FV  29.44  22.15  0.2  94.2  651 
           
V1 minus C1  12.74  12.50  0  49.1  651 
Sales   13189.4  31688.5  0.04  250780.7  651 
           
 
 
It is interesting to note the share of control rights controlled by the largest shareholder, 
V1. On average, the largest shareholder in the sample controls 35.69 per cent of the 
votes in the firm, see Table 3. This concentrated ownership is, as mentioned in the 
introduction  remarkable,  not  only  because  of  the  relative  level  compared  to  other 
European  and  Anglo-Saxon  countries,  but  also because  of  the  relative  size  of  the 
Swedish firms in the sample (mean sales SEK13,189.4 million). The sample of firms 
is therefore consistent with the view that the Swedish economy to a large extent is 
dominated  by  closely  held,  relatively  large,  often  old  industrial  and  multinational 
firms (Agnblad et al., 2001, Högfeldt, 2004, Henrekson and Jakobsson, 2006). 
 
When considering cash flow-rights (C1), the share controlled by of the largest owner 
is on average 23.41 per cent, substantially lower than the vote rights (V1=35.69%), 
but still relatively high in an international comparison. When looking at the combined 
holdings of the five largest owners, they on average control 47 per cent of the capital 
and 60 per cent of the votes.   
 
For the foreign and domestic institutional owners cash flow rights seem to be more 
important than control which is in line with our expectation. The ownership of vote 
rights (FV=18.79% and  IV=10.65%) is substantially below the level of cash flow 
rights  (FC=21.50%  and  IC=13.99%).  For  both  ownership  types  the  difference  is 
around three per cent, which also support the hypothesis that the two ownership types 
are in fact very similar. That is, the overwhelming majority of the foreign owners are 
in  fact  institutions.  The  incentive  structure  and  the  influence  of  ownership  on  the 
performance should therefore be similar for foreign and domestic institutional owners. 
 
The  correlation  matrix  in  Table  4  ,  see  Appendix  A,  also  confirms  the  negative 
relationship  between  both  foreign  and  institutional  ownership  vis-à-vis  control 
instruments such as vote-differentiation. It is interesting to note that the vote rights of 
the largest single owner (V1) are correlated with investments whereas capital rights 
(C1)  are  not.  Furthermore,  both  domestic  institutional  and  foreign  capital  is 
significantly correlated with sales.   12 
 
 
Results and analysis 
In order to test the impact of different types of owners a panel data estimation has 
been constructed. With an emphasis on data where the cross-sectional dimension is 
larger than the time dimension, a panel data model can be constructed to follow the 
same individual firm over the entire period. The major motivation for using a panel 
data model in this way is the ability to control for possibly correlated, time-invariant 
heterogeneity without observing it (Himmelberg et al., 1999). 
 
When testing the functional relationship of ownership types and performance of firms 
one would then like to control for the firm or industry specific effects. We therefore 
use a fixed-effects model with time and industry effects. While ownership may differ 
significantly  across  firms,  Zhou  (2001)  show  that  these  changes  in  ownership 
(investigates  managerial  ownership)  typically  changes  slowly  over  time  within  a 
company. By relaying on within variation consequently, firm fixed effects estimators 
may not detect an effect of ownership on performance even if one exists. Other types 
of owners however, such as institutional owners, most likely alter their ownership 
stakes more often. Industry variation may also be substantial, making fixed effects 
models with industry effects viable as an alternative to firm effects. An unbalanced 
panel dataset consisting of 651 observations has been used for all the estimations.
8  
 
In  the  regressions  the  relative  change  in  market  value  from  period  t-1  until  t 
1 1) ( − − − t t t M M M is the dependent variable. The ratio of investments in t to market 
value  in  t-1  ( 1 − t t M I )  is  used  as  an  explanatory  variable.  In  addition  to  the 
explanatory variable, interaction terms of  1 − t t M I  and relevant ownership variables 
(measured  in  percentages)  are  employed  in  order  to  test  the  effects  of  ownership 
concentration and vote-differentiation. 
 
Thus,  the  equations  estimated  have  the  following  general  form: 
XZ X Y 3 2 1 β β β + + = , and the marginal effect  ) / ( dX dY is therefore  Z 3 2 β β + which 
in this case has the economic interpretation marginal q, qm. 
 
The equations are then estimated both in terms of cash-flow rights (Capital, C) and 
control rights (Votes, V), for each ownership type. The functional form of the impact 
of ownership on performance is then tested by incorporating the squared institutional 
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where Zi represent explanatory variables. The marginal effect, qm, of equation 5 is 
therefore: 
 
                                                 
8 The data set contain 110 firms over a period of 6 years. Of these 660 observations 9 were identified as 
outliers. These were deleted due to obvious errors in the data material.    13 
  i i m Z Z q 1 1 2 1 + + + + = β β β K             6) 
 
The intercept δ is, as noted earlier, the rate of depreciation and therefore not relevant 
for the interpretation of qm
9. 
 
For the overall sample, the estimated marginal q is 0.693, see Table 4 column A, 
which indicates an inefficient investment performance by the Swedish firms. In fact 
the  estimated  marginal  q  is  remarkably  persistent  with  previous  estimations  on 
Swedish data (qm around 0.65), see Gugler et al., (2002), and Bjuggren et al. (2007). 
The estimates of marginal q are also robust with respect to the choice of estimation 
technique.  Robust  estimation  methods  such  as  quintile  median  regression  and 
iteratively  reweighed  least  square  which  control  for  non-normality  and  outliers 
generate estimates of marginal q very close to 0.70. 
 
Table 4.    Fixed-Effects estimation; Average  
Marginal q, interacted with Votes minus Capital (V1 – C1). 
 




Column A  
 
Column B 













 (V1 – C1) 
  -0.005*** 
     (-1.67) 
     
Average qm   0.693  0.695 
R
2   0.477  0.479 
F-value  13.57  13.35 
No. observations  651  651 
No of firms  110  110 
t-values in brackets 
                                   * indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent significance 
level, *** at 10 percent significance level 
 
The use of vote-differentiated shares is expected to have a negative impact in all 
estimations. This effect is tested by taking the difference between vote rights and 
capital rights held by the largest owner (In a firm without vote-differentiated shares 
the largest owner will hold the same amount of vote as capital-rights). This difference 
is then interacted with It/Mt-1. The results show, see Table 4 column B, that vote-
differentiation creates a wedge between vote rights and capital shares that is negative 
for performance. Firms without vote-differentiated shares have on average a marginal 
q  of  0.759,  whilst  firms  that  do  have  a  vote-differentiated  share  structure  have  a 
marginal q of 0.695 on average. The results confirm hypothesis 3, and also verify the 
findings in earlier studies on ownership structure, dual-class shares and performance, 
such as Bjuggren et al., (2007).  
 
                                                 
9 Note that when differentiating with respect to investments, It, the deprecation rate, δ, disappears, and 
hence has no relevance for the interpretation of qm.     14 
Table  5  presents  regression  results  with  domestic  institutional  ownership 
concentration, in terms of cash-flow rights (IC). The results in terms of control rights 
(IV) are presented in Table 6. The results support the hypothesis that institutional 
ownership has a positive and statistically significant effect on firm performance (H1). 
This relationship is also non-linear as expected (H2), controlling for non-linearity and 
vote-differentiation more than doubles the R
2-values, suggesting that dual-class share 
affect the ownership-performance relationship substantially (H3).  
 
Table 5.  Fixed-Effects estimation; Institutional Owners’ Capital 
Share (IC) controlling for Vote-Differentiation 
 
































































IC interacted  with 
VoteDifferentiatio dummy 
 
-  -0.001 
(-0.15) 




 interacted  with 
VoteDifferentiation dummy 
 
-  -  -  0.0005 
(-1.52) 
         
Average qm  0.693  0.693  0.738  0.727 
R
2   0.217  0.478  0.229  0.482 
F-value  13.24  12.95  13.03  12.51 
No. observations  651  651  651  651 
No of firms  110  110  110  110 
t-values in brackets 
* indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent significance level,   
*** at 10 percent significance level 
 
 
Looking at vote rights (IV) (see Table 6), institutional ownership is again significantly 
positively related to the performance of the firms, which supports hypothesis 1. As 
stated earlier the relationship is found to be non-linear, which indicates a positive but 
diminishing  effect  of  institutional  ownership.  The  estimations  are  also  remarkably 
robust for both types of shares, i.e. ownership measured by either votes or capital. The 
negative  impact  of  vote-differentiation  is  not  significant  in  the  estimations  with 
institutional ownership; however, the coefficients are negative as expected. Interacting 
domestic institutional ownership with the dummy for vote-differentiation doubles the 
R
2-values, which again proves the importance of controlling for this type of devices. 
 




Table 6.   Fixed-Effects estimation; Institutional Owners’ Vote 
Rights (IV) controlling for Vote-Differentiation 
 





























































IV interacted  with 
VoteDifferentiation dummy 
 
-  0.002 
(0.37) 




 interacted  with 
VoteDifferentiation dummy 
 
-  -  -  0.0003 
(0.75) 
         
Average qm  0.670  0.717  0.824  0.751 
R
2   0.217  0.479  0.242  0.484 
F-value  13.28  12.96  13.21  12.60 
No. observations  651  651  651  651 
No of firms  110  110  110  110 
t-values in brackets 
* indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent significance level,   
*** at 10 percent significance level 
 
Table 5 and 6 also show the estimated effect of vote-differentiate shares. It has been 
shown that the separation of cash-flow rights and control rights alters the incentive of 
owners and thereby affects investment decisions negatively (Bjuggren, et al., 2007). 
We test this impact again by including an interaction term with the dummy for vote-
differentiation. The result of this additional test of the effect from a separation of 
control and cash-flow rights support earlier findings, and indicate that firms with vote-
differentiated  shares  have  a  lower  investment  performance  (H3).  In  Table  6,  the 
average  firm  with  an  institutional  vote-share  of  on  average  around  10  per  cent 
(ICaverage=10.65), without vote-differential, has a marginal q of 0.808. This indicates a 
somewhat inferior investment performance and a return on investments below the cost 
of capital. The effect of domestic institutional ownership in terms of votes is however 
positive. With the same level of institutional ownership but  for  a  firm with vote-
differentiation the average marginal q is 0.751, noticeably below 0.808 and also below 
1,  which  means  over-investment  vis-à-vis  the  shareholders,  and  a  return  on 
investments below the cost of capital. This result consequently support the proposed 
inferior investment performance associated with the increasing agency problems, due 
to entrenchment of ownership as expected from hypothesis 3.   16 
 
The results for the estimation of foreign ownerships’ impact on performance and its 
functional form are given in Tables 7 and 8. These results are in line with those found 
for  institutional  ownership,  which  maintain  the  assumption  that  foreign  and 
institutional owners are in fact very similar.  
 
Table 7.   Fixed-Effects estimation; Foreign Owners’ Capital Share 
(FC) controlling for Vote-Differentiation 
 





























































FC interacted  with 
VoteDifferentiation dummy 
 
-  0.003 
(1.22) 




 interacted  with 
VoteDifferentiation dummy 
 
-  -  -  0.0005* 
(3.86) 
         
Average qm  0.688  0.720  0.752  0.607 
R
2   0.240  0.482  0.252  0.497 
F-value  13.38  13.12  13.27  13.28 
No. observations  651  651  651  651 
No of firms  110  110  110  110 
t-values in brackets 
 * indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent significance level,       
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Table 8.   Fixed-Effects estimation; Foreign Owners Vote Rights (FV) 
controlling for Vote-Differentiation 
 





























































FV interacted  with 
VoteDifferentiation dummy 
 
-  0.0068* 
(2.54) 




 interacted  with 
VoteDifferentiation dummy 
 
-  -  -  0.0003** 
(2.26) 
         
Average qm  0.699  0.777  0.922  0.759 
R
2   0.247  0.490  0.274  0.504 
F-value  13.63  13.58  13.81  13.64 
No. observations  651  651  651  651 
No of firms  110  110  110  110 
t-values in brackets 
* indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent significance level,   
*** at 10 percent significance level 
  
 
The results for foreign ownership again confirm hypothesis 3 that the use of vote-
differentiated  shares  lower  the  performance  of  firms.  This  effect  is  probably  due 
mainly to the agency conflicts that arise from the additional separation of ownership 
and control in these firms (H4).
10 
 
Since  foreign  owners  can  be  assumed  to  mainly  be  composed  of  institutional 
investors,  it  is  finally  appropriate  to  analyse  the  combined  effect  of  domestic 
institutional  and  foreign  owners.  This  is  done  by  summarizing  the  domestic 
institutional and foreign ownership. The results for these estimations are found in 
Table 9 and 10. 
 
                                                 
10 As robustness test we have also regressed domestic institutional and foreign ownership and dual-
class shares on Tobin’s average q (measured as market-to-book ratio), controlling for sales and growth 
of sales. Their results corroborate our findings. Dual-class shares have a significant negative effect on 
Tobin’s  average  q,  divergence  between  C1  and  V1  is  negative  and  institutional  investors  have  a 
positive  but  marginally  diminishing  effect  on  Tobin’s  q.  The  results  are  thus  consistent  with  our 
findings above. The results with Tobin’s q can be obtained from the authors upon request.     18 
 
Table 9.   Fixed-Effects estimation; Domestic Institutional and 
Foreign Owners’ Capital Share (IC) controlling for Vote-Differentiation 
 
































































(IC + FC) interacted with 
VoteDifferentiation dummy 
 
-  0.001 
(0.64) 




 interacted with 
VoteDifferentiation dummy 
 
-  -  -  0.0003* 
(3.39) 
         
Average qm  0.698  0.729  0.759  0.731 
R
2   0.481  0.481  0.483  0.492 
F-value  13.24  13.09  13.16  13.04 
No. observations  651  651  651  651 
No of firms  110  110  110  110 
t-values in brackets 
* indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent significance level,   
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Table 10.   Fixed-Effects estimation; Domestic Institutional and 
Foreign Owners’ Vote Rights (IV) controlling for Vote-Differentiation 
 





























































(IV + FV) interacted  with 
VoteDifferentiation dummy 
 
-  0.004** 
(2.00) 




 interacted  with 
VoteDifferentiation dummy 
 
-  -  -  0.0003* 
(2.55) 
         
Average qm  0.721  0.765  0.830  0.793 
R
2   0.486  0.489  0.494  0.501 
F-value  13.69  13.53  13.79  13.48 
No. observations  651  651  651  651 
No of firms  110  110  110  110 
t-values in brackets 
* indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent significance level,   
*** at 10 percent significance level 
 
In all cases we have also tested for cubic specifications of the regression models. 
These estimation results have however been found to be insignificant and thus not 
reported. The results in all six tables are in fact remarkably stable with respect to the 
structural form of the model. 
 
On average our estimated marginal q’s are in the range 0.7 to 0.8, and all our results 
are consistent with hypothesis 1, 2, and 3. Consequently, a positive but marginally 
diminishing  effect  of  domestic  institutional  and  foreign  ownership  is  found.  This 
positive effect disappears in firms with disproportional equity structure. 
 
Our results also indicate a clear direction of causality: institutional investors improve 
investment performance. Reversed causality would imply that institutional investors 
are attracted to firms that are making superior investment decisions. In this case one 
would expect a linear relationship between the fraction of shares held by institutions 
and marginal q. The non-linear effect of institutional ownership and performance is 
therefore  only  consistent  with  the  proposition  that  investors  affect  investment 
behaviour. Naturally, this argument is further supported by the fact that we observe 
two  distinct  effects  in  firm  with  proportional  ownership  and  firm  with  dual-class 
shares.  
   20 
 Conclusions 
 
Institutional owners, often associated with low control incentives, can be argued to 
have  a  disciplining  effect  on  controlling  owners  and  managers.  Consequently,  a 
positive relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance can be 
expected. In this paper we examine how institutional owners affect firm performance. 
We look at both domestic institutional and foreign owners. The reason that we use 
foreign  owners  in  addition  to  domestic  institutional  owners  is  that  this  ownership 
category is primarily composed of institutional owners and can therefore be expected 
to  behave  in  the  same  fashion  as  domestic  institutional  owners.  As  performance 
measure we use marginal q that measures the returns on investment relative to the cost 
of  capital.  This  performance  measure  also  alleviates  the  problems  associated  with 
average measures of performance, such as endogeneity and reversed causality. 
 
By utilizing a fixed-effects model which accounts for time and industry effects we 
find  that  both  domestic  institutional  and  foreign  ownership  have  a  positive  and 
marginally diminishing effect on firm performance. The results confirm a non-linear 
relationship between ownership and performance. The results are also robust when 
testing the combined effect of domestic institutional and foreign ownership. Foreign 
investors are predominantly also institutional investors.     
 
Examining Swedish firms also allows us to control for the effect of vote-differentiated 
shares. When firms have vote-differentiated shares the positive effect associated with 
domestic institutional and foreign ownership disappears. This is in line with agency-
cost theory, which suggests that the agency-costs are substantially higher in this type 
of firms. As most studies on the impact of ownership structure on firm performance 
are done on Anglo-Saxon data, this paper adds to the existing debate regarding the 
effects of this type of control instruments. 
 
Domestic institutional and foreign owners’ are found to have a positive but non-linear 
effect on performance. This is a clear indication of the direction of causality. It has 
been suggested that institutional investors have relatively higher ownership stakes in 
certain firms because they are attracted to firms with an already superior performance.  
Our  results  are  however  consistent  with  the  view  that  these  investors  in  effect 
influence investment behaviour positively. This result is further supported by that fact 
that this positive effect loses significance in firms controlled by dual-class shares.   21 
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Appendix 1,   Table 4. Correlation matrix  
  Sales  Mt-Mt-1 
/Mt-1 
It/Mt-1  C1  V1  FC  FV  IC  IV  V1 – C1  FC+IC  FV+IV  VoteDiff 
Sales  1.00                         
Mt-Mt-1/Mt-1  - 0.059  1.00                       
It/Mt-1  - 0.017    0.614*  1.00                     
C1  - 0.112*  0.016  0.043  1.00                   
V1  - 0.023  0.019    0.100*    0.764*  1.00                 
FC    0.241*  0.046  - 0.025  - 0.118*  - 0.170*  1.00               
FV  0.072  0.053  - 0.024  - 0.058  - 0.219*    0.928*  1.00             
IC    0.205*  - 0.057  - 0.005  - 0.200*  - 0.130*  - 0.044  - 0.036  1.00           
IV    0.232*  - 0.046  - 0.009  - 0.212*  - 0.281*  0.020  0.036    0.894*  1.00         
V1 – C1    0.174*  - 0.021  0.064  - 0.112*    0.385*  - 0.064  - 0.154*  0.049  - 0.151*  1.00       
FC+IC    0.320*  0.063  - 0.080*  - 0.220*  - 0.220*    0.830*    0.883*    0.520*    0.515*  - 0.075  1.00     
FV+IV    0.171*    0.080*  - 0.092*  - 0.157*  - 0.323*    0.812*    0.812*    0.388*    0.500*  - 0.317*     0.911*  1.00   
VoteDiff.    0.175*  - 0.023  0.002  - 0.009  0.386*  - 0.062  - 0.151*  0.049  - 0.185*    0.659*  - 0.026  - 0.203*  1.00 
* indicates significance at 5 percent level 
 
 
 